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TETHERING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:  
THE CASE AGAINST CHEVRON DEFERENCE FOR 
FCC JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS 
 
Daniel A. Lyons 
 
Abstract:  Like many other agencies, the Federal Communications 
Commission has seen significant regulatory growth under President 
Obama. But unlike health care, financial reform, and other areas, this 
growth has come without statutory guidance from Congress.   The FCC’s 
assertion of jurisdiction over broadband service is reminiscent of its 
earlier attempts to regulate cable and to deregulate telephone service, 
efforts that courts have viewed skeptically in the absence of specific 
statutory authorization.  But this skepticism is in tension with Chevron, 
which grants agencies substantial deference to interpret ambiguities in 
the statutes that they administer. 
 
This article argues that Chevron deference should not extend to agency 
jurisdictional claims, such as the FCC’s claim to authority over 
broadband.  For both constitutional and policy reasons, courts should 
distinguish between agency action that fills a gap in a statutory scheme 
and action that defines the outer boundary of that scheme.  As the 
Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way through the judicial 
system, courts should not allow the agency to define the limits of its own 
authority, and should instead search closely for a grant of authority from 
Congress. 
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TETHERING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:  
THE CASE AGAINST CHEVRON DEFERENCE FOR 
FCC JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS 
 
Daniel A. Lyons* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Reregulation has become the predominant theme of the early 
Obama administration.  From the financial markets1 and consumer lending2 
to the health care industry,3 the President and Congress have enacted 
statutes designed to curb what they saw as the deregulatory excesses of the 
past three decades.  As a result, agencies throughout Washington are 
preparing to assume a more active role throughout the economy, overseeing 
and managing various markets in accordance with the will of the political 
branches. 
The Federal Communications Commission has seen a similar sea 
change in its regulation of the telecommunications industry.  Since Julius 
Genachowski assumed the chairmanship in 2009, the number of open 
dockets at the Commission has ballooned to over three thousand.4  Among 
other innovations, the Commission has released an ambitious roadmap to 
reallocate the electromagnetic spectrum5 and has begun regulating services 
traditionally considered to be at the periphery of its authority, such as 
wireless data transmission.6  Perhaps most notably, it has fired the opening 
salvos in the battle for net neutrality, a high-profile, high-stakes rulemaking 
proceeding that would extend the Commission’s jurisdiction over 
broadband internet transmission.7 
But unlike its counterparts at the SEC or Health & Human Services, 
the FCC has begun reregulating telecommunications without a clear 
congressional mandate.  This distinction is important, because the 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  Thanks to Elizabeth Foote, Dan Kanstroom, 
Crystal Lyons, Randolph May, Zygmunt Plater, Geoffrey Why, and Christopher Yoo for feedback and 
commentary, and to the Journal of Corporation Law for organizing the symposium for which this article 
was written.   
1 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203 (2010). 
2 Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub.L. 111-24 (2009); Student Aid and Financial Responsibility Act, 
Pub.L. 111-152 (2010).   
3 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. 111-148 (2010); Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub.L. 111-152 (2010). 
4 FCC Order Would Make More Filings Available Online, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Feb. 8, 2011. 
5 See Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, 2010 WL 972375 (F.C.C. March 16, 2010). 
6 Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other 
Providers of Mobile Data Services, WT Docket No. 05-265 (Apr. 21, 2010).  
7 See Preserving the Open Internet, 2010 WL 5281676 (F.C.C. Dec. 23, 2010). 
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telecommunications world has changed dramatically since Congress last 
overhauled the Communications Act in 1996—an overhaul that was itself 
largely deregulatory in focus.8  The Act provides little support for (and is 
arguably hostile to) the agency’s efforts to enact comprehensive regulation 
beyond its traditional core of broadcasting, cable, and telephone 
communication. Yet undaunted by this lack of a legislative rudder, the 
Commission has nonetheless taken upon itself the mantle of expanding its 
jurisdiction and developing the next generation of American 
telecommunications law.9 
The Commission’s tendency toward aggrandizement is familiar to 
the old war horses of past telecommunications policy battles.  When cable 
television emerged in the 1950s, the Commission recognized that it lacked 
authority to regulate this new technology under the Communications Act.10  
But as this new technology flourished, the Commission used its ancillary 
authority to heap increasingly intensive regulations upon the new industry, 
until the Supreme Court finally struck down certain regulations as beyond 
the agency’s statutory authority in 1979.11  Similarly, when the Commission 
determined that that the statutory framework governing telephones was 
unsuited to the competitive landscape of the late 1980s, it began to rewrite 
the Communications Act and guide the industry toward deregulation—only 
to see the court strike down its aspirations as ultra vires.12  In each instance, 
the court curbed the Commission’s attempts to adopt a complex regulatory 
scheme without a clear legislative mandate, which in turn prompted 
Congress to provide more explicit authority to act in accordance with the 
will of the political branches.  And thus far, it appears that the 
Commission’s current effort to regulate broadband will fit this pattern as 
well.13 
This history, and the Commission’s current push toward 
reregulation, highlight an important but often ignored tension in modern 
administrative law.  The Chevron doctrine generally requires courts to defer 
to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous language in a statute that the 
agency administers.14  Chevron is premised on the assumption that agencies, 
not courts, should “fill any gap left…by Congress” in the agency’s organic 
                                                 
8 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-104. 
9 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 1013, 1068 (1998) (“As a matter of simple practice, administrative agencies have become America’s 
common law courts.”). 
10 Frontier Broad. Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-54 (1958). 
11 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); see Daniel Lyons, Technology Convergence and 
Federalism: Who Should Control the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 383, 391-92 (2010). 
12 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 
1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
13 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
14 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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statute.15  But such deference is less appropriate in cases involving the 
agency’s jurisdiction.  In these cases, the agency is not merely filling a gap 
within a statutory framework, but is instead defining the outer limits of that 
framework.  There is a difference in kind between the policy question “what 
rules should govern broadband?” and the legal question “does the 
Communications Act allow the Commission to make rules governing 
broadband?”  Courts appropriately defer broadly to agency expertise when 
answering the former question, but should reserve the latter question to “the 
province…of the judicial department.”16   
This essay examines this distinction between policy and 
jurisdictional questions through the FCC’s history of rulemaking at the 
horizon of its statutory authority.  In the telecommunications context, courts 
have often viewed the Commission’s efforts to expand its jurisdiction with 
skepticism, but do not often reconcile their decisions with Chevron’s 
seeming grant of near-plenary authority to agencies in such matters.  For 
both constitutional and institutional reasons, this skepticism is well-
grounded and should apply to the Commission’s current efforts at 
reregulation.  As the Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way 
through the judicial system, courts must tread carefully but firmly, 
respecting the Commission’s primacy in the policymaking sphere but 
assuring that this rulemaking remains bound within the jurisdictional 
confines of the Communications Act. 
 
I. REGULATION, DEREGULATION, AND REREGULATION: THREE CASE 
STUDIES 
 
A. Cable Regulation 
 
Compared to the modern telecommunications industry, the 1934 
Communications Act was elegantly simple.  The Act charged the newly-
created Federal Communications Commission with regulation of two 
primary areas of responsibility.  Two-way communication by wire 
(telephone service) was governed by a common carriage scheme codified in 
Title II of the Act, while broadcast communication over radio waves was 
governed by a licensing system described in Title III.17  When the cable 
industry was born in the 1950s as a service that retransmitted broadcast 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 
YALE L.J. 2580, 2583-84 (2006) (“describing Chevron as a “counter-Marbury” for the executive 
branch). 
16Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
17 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.  The Act consolidated the duties formerly 
performed by two different federal agencies: the Federal Radio Commission, which had administered a 
Title III-like licensing scheme to govern radio broadcasting, and which was abolished by the 1934 Act, 
and the Interstate Commerce Commission, which before the 1934 Act had loosely regulated telephone 
companies under the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910. 
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television stations by wire to homes with poor over-the-air reception,18 the 
Commission initially disclaimed any jurisdiction: the new service did not fit 
neatly into either of its clearly-defined statutory mandates.19 
By the 1960s, however, the Commission slowly began to regulate 
the cable industry using its ancillary authority under Title I.  Title I operates 
as an FCC “necessary and proper” clause.  It allows the Commission to 
assert limited jurisdiction over services not directly within the 
Commission’s purview, if (1) the service in question involves 
communication by radio or wire and (2) regulation of the service in question 
is reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s performance of its duties under 
the Act.20  The Commission asserted that cable regulation was necessary 
because the cable industry was increasingly affecting broadcasters, in ways 
that threatened the Commission’s efforts to discharge its Title III duties. 
The Court initially agreed, allowing the Commission to adopt rules 
limiting cable companies’ ability to rebroadcast out-of-market signals21 and 
requiring large cable companies to offer original local programming as a 
condition of importing these distant signals22 (though Chief Justice Burger 
noted in a concurrence that the latter restriction “strain[ed] the outer limits” 
of its jurisdiction).23  But in United States v. Midwest Video (commonly 
called Midwest Video II), the Court struck regulations that would have 
required cable companies to dedicate certain channels to public use.24  The 
Court explained that such regulations treated cable companies as common 
carriers.  Title III explicitly restricted the Commission from regulating 
broadcasters as common carriers, because such access would unduly 
infringe upon broadcasters’ private journalistic integrity.  As a result, the 
Court explained, the Commission could not claim that such regulation of 
cable providers was reasonably ancillary to its Title III authority over 
broadcast.25  While the Title III prohibition did not explicitly forbid such 
regulation of cable companies, it reflected a policy of balancing public 
access against editorial discretion, with which the Commission interfered:   
[W]ithout reference to the provisions of the Act 
directly governing broadcasting, the Commission’s 
[ancillary] jurisdiction...would be unbounded. 
Though afforded wide latitude in its supervision 
over communication by wire, the Commission was 
                                                 
18 See Lyons, supra note 11, at 390-91. 
19 Frontier Broad. Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-54 (1958) (“We do not believe that ... [cable] 
systems are engaged in performing the service of communications common carriers within the 
contemplation of the applicable provisions of the Communications Act.”). 
20 United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). 
21 Id. at 177-78. 
22 United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (“Midwest Video I”). 
23 Id. at 676 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
24 FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 706 (1979) (“Midwest Video II”). 
25 Id . 
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not delegated unrestrained authority...Though the 
lack of congressional guidance has in the past led 
us to defer--albeit cautiously--to the Commission’s 
judgment regarding the scope of its authority, here 
there are strong indications that agency flexibility 
was to be sharply delimited.”26 
 
Midwest Video accompanied several DC Circuit Court decisions that cast 
additional doubt on the Commission’s cable regulations.  In part because of 
this judicial backlash, Congress passed the 1984 Cable Act, which gave the 
Commission direct authority to regulate the industry while proscribing clear 
limits on the agency’s jurisdiction. 
 
B. Telephone Deregulation 
 
The Court again crossed swords with the agency in 1994, in 
response to the Commission’s effort to deregulate parts of the telephone 
industry.  Title II required each interstate telephone company to file tariffs 
with the Commission containing a list of the company’s services and rates, 
which the Commission reviewed for reasonableness.27  In 1934, tariffing 
helped prevent Bell Telephone from abusing its position as the nation’s 
monopoly phone company.28  But by 1994, an antitrust decree had broken 
up the Bell monopoly, and interstate long-distance telephone service was 
increasingly competitive.29  The Commission found that, at least for those 
long-distance providers that lacked market power, competition would be 
sufficient to assure just and reasonable rates.  Moreover, the tariff 
requirement placed a substantial burden on smaller and newer long-distance 
companies.  So, exercising its authority to “modify” the tariff requirement 
upon good cause, the Commission excused long-distance companies from 
the tariff requirement if they lacked market power—essentially excusing all 
but AT&T (formerly Bell’s long-distance division) from Title II’s 
comprehensive rate regulation scheme.30 
The Court found that this attempt to deregulate long-distance 
communications lay beyond the Commission’s authority.  The Court 
explained that “modify” refers only to gradual or incremental change.  
Therefore as used in the statute, the word did not permit the wholesale 
abandonment of the tariff system that the Commission envisioned.31  The 
Court further explained that rate-filings are “the essential characteristic” of 
                                                 
26 Id. at 706, 708. 
27 47 U.S.C. § 203. 
28 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 221 (1994). 
29 Id. at 222. 
30 Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2). 
31 MCI, 512 U.S. at 222. 
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a regulated industry, and that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress would 
leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even 
substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely 
that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to 
‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”32  Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit 
struck down a similar effort by the Commission to instill competition into 
local telephone markets through mandatory unbundling.33  The Commission 
labored under what it saw as an anachronistic statutory scheme for another 
two years, until Congress passed the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which 
ushered in many of the changes that the Commission had sought to adopt on 
its own.34 
 
C.  Broadband Reregulation 
 
The Commission has recently embarked upon another paradigm 
shift at the edge of its statutory authority, most notably by imposing net 
neutrality restrictions on broadband internet providers.35  Net neutrality 
began as a list of four non-binding principles that the Commission 
circulated alongside its 2005 order deregulating broadband internet service 
over phone lines.36  Yet when the Commission found that Comcast acted 
contrary to those principles, it imposed a duty of nondiscriminatory traffic 
management upon broadband providers and sanctioned Comcast for 
violating that duty.37  As in Midwest Video II, the Commission 
acknowledged that it lacked authority to directly regulate the service at 
issue, but nonetheless imposed common-carriage-like duties upon providers 
pursuant to its Title I ancillary authority.38 
And as in Midwest Video II, the court vacated the Commission’s 
order because the agency lacked authority to regulate Comcast’s network 
                                                 
32 Id. at 231. 
33 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
34 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-104. 
35 One could argue that the Commission’s current wave of reregulation preceded the Obama 
Administration.  In the early 2000s, even as the Commission pursued a generally deregulatory policy, it 
adopted a series of regulations designed to increase government oversight in one area: the protection of 
children from indecent material over the airwaves.  The centerpiece of this reregulatory effort was the 
adoption of a more stringent standard for indecency, a policy whose ultimate fate remains to be seen.  
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1800 (2009) (upholding new policy under APA 
review but leaving open possibility of constitutional challenge).  But in an action that fits the general 
model, the D.C. Circuit struck down the Commission’s efforts to impose V-chip technology on 
television manufacturers, because this complex new scheme lay beyond the scope of the agency’s Title I 
authority.  See Am. Lib. Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689 (2005). 
36 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Policy 
Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005); see generally Daniel A. Lyons, Virtual Takings: The Coming 
Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2011). 
37 Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC 
Rcd. 13028 (2008). 
38 Id. 
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management practices.39  The Court explained that the Commission cannot 
rely on Title I to develop a general framework for broadband regulation,40 
nor can it claim authority under Title I to enforce general statements of 
policy by Congress, which do not themselves grant authority to the 
agency.41  Rather, the court reiterated Midwest Video II’s holding that the 
Commission must show how the regulation of particular broadband network 
management practices is “reasonably ancillary” to the Commission’s 
statutorily mandated responsibilities.42  After all, the court noted, 
“‘administrative agencies may [act] only pursuant to authority delegated to 
them by Congress.’”43 To permit the Commission general authority under 
Title I to regulate broadband networks would “virtually free the 
Commission from its congressional tether.”44  After rejecting the 
Commission’s attempts to tie its rule to specific founts of statutory authority 
(most notably a claim that broad regulatory authority is required to execute 
a trivial reporting obligation), the Court vacated the order as beyond the 
Commission’s jurisdiction.45 
 
II. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY JURISDICTIONAL 
CLAIMS 
 
The Comcast court repeatedly emphasized the need to “tether” the 
Commission to its statutory mandate.  This emphasis reflects a theme that 
runs throughout this line of cases: the agency cannot unilaterally rewrite 
telecommunications law, either by deviating significantly from what it sees 
as an obsolete statutory scheme or by claiming broad regulatory authority 
over services beyond its jurisdictional core.  In each instance, the court 
curbed the Commission’s ambitions and prevented it from developing a 
general common law of telecommunications unmoored from its statutory 
authority. 
Yet this skepticism is in tension with the generally deferential thrust 
of administrative law since Chevron.46  As Cass Sunstein has noted, 
Chevron has become “the undisputed starting point for any assessment of 
the allocation of authority between federal courts and administrative 
agencies.”47  Under Chevron’s familiar two-step process, the court first must 
determine whether the statute in question is clear or ambiguous.48  If the 
                                                 
39 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
40 Id. at 651. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 652. 
43 Id. at 654 (quoting Am. Lib. Ass’n, 406 F.3d at 691).  
44 Id. at 655. 
45 Id. 
46 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
47 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).  
48 See id. 
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language is clear, the court must enforce Congress’s intent; if ambiguous, 
the Court must defer to any agency interpretation that is reasonable, on the 
theory that Congress intends agencies, not courts, to fill the gaps in statutes 
that the agencies administer.49  Importantly, the Chevron doctrine does not 
explicitly distinguish between an agency’s resolution of policy questions 
clearly within the scope of its delegated authority, and agency conclusions 
regarding the boundary of that authority.50   
It should.  The history discussed above, and the Commission’s 
ongoing efforts to regulate broadband, highlight the courts’ unease with 
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of the scope of its own power.  These 
cases are a subset of what Cass Sunstein refers to as “Chevron Step Zero”: 
the incoherent body of law regarding when the Chevron doctrine should 
apply.51  While Sunstein and others are skeptical of these “step zero” 
inquiries, there are several reasons why courts should decline to give 
Chevron deference to agency jurisdictional claims. 
 
A. Chevron and Congressional Intent 
 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the question of 
whether Chevron should apply to agency jurisdictional claims.  Justice 
Brennan has asserted that such deference is inappropriate when interpreting 
statutes that “confine the scope of [an agency’s] jurisdiction.”52  His 
argument hinges on the fact that Chevron applies only to statutes that 
Congress has “entrusted [the agency] to administer”53—and agencies do not 
“administer” statutes that confine their jurisdiction.54  Justice Scalia has 
disagreed, asserting that one cannot distinguish meaningfully between 
jurisdictional statutes and those that authorize an agency to administer 
authority entrusted to it.55  This is consistent with his general view that 
Chevron deference should governs any interpretation of an agency’s organic 
statute that reflects the agency’s “authoritative” position.56 
While Justice Scalia is correct that the line between “jurisdictional” 
and “policy” questions is somewhat murky, his argument goes too far.  As 
Ernest Gellhorn and Paul Verkuil have argued, Chevron deference stems 
primarily from Congressional intent:  it applies only “as a consequence of 
statutory ambiguity, and then only if the reviewing court finds an implicit 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See generally id. 
52 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion. 
53 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
54 Mississippi Power, 487 U.S. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
55Id. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  No other Justices joined Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence; the majority decided the case on other grounds. 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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delegation of authority to the agency.”57  Or in Sunstein’s words, “[c]ourts 
defer to agency interpretations of law when, and because, Congress has told 
them to do so.”58   
But with respect to jurisdictional claims, the very question 
presented is whether Congress intended the agency’s authority to extend as 
far as the agency seeks.  For this reason, Gellhorn and Verkuil explain, 
Chevron cannot apply to “extension of an agency’s jurisdiction beyond its 
core powers.”59  In such cases, “no implicit delegation of law-interpreting 
authority was granted to the agency” and therefore “deference to the 
agency’s judgment on jurisdictional issues cannot be traced to congressional 
intent.”60  Moreover, “[t]he more significant the question and the more 
impact that expansion of the agency’s jurisdiction is likely to have, the 
greater the likelihood that Congress did not intend implicitly to delegate that 
determination to an agency.”61 
While the Court has never held that Chevron is inapplicable to such 
questions, several cases support this conclusion.  Perhaps most dramatically, 
the Mead Court62 held that Chevron applies only “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying 
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”63  Mead teaches that before 
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the Court must first 
satisfy itself that Congress intended it to do so.   In a similar vein, the MCI 
Court held that “modify” was not ambiguous in part because it was 
“unlikely” that Congress intended to delegate such broad authority in so 
“subtle” a fashion.64  The Court reached the same conclusion in Brown & 
Williamson,65 where the Court held that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 
did not grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco (despite broad statutory 
language that, textually, supported the agency’s claim) because it was 
unlikely that Congress intended to do so, in light of other tobacco statutes.66 
If Congressional intent is truly Chevron’s animating policy, then 
deferring to agency conclusions regarding its jurisdictional limits is 
somewhat illogical: it would imply that Congress intended the agency to 
determine what Congress intended.  This circularity illustrates the 
distinction between jurisdictional claims and the more routine policy 
                                                 
57 Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 
1007 (1999). (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 137 F.3d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)). 
58 Sunstein, supra note 47, at 198. 
59 Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 57, at 1018. 
60 Id. at 1008. 
61 Id. 
62 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
63 Id. at 226-227. 
64 MCI, 512 U.S. at231. 
65 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
66 Id. at 159. 
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questions that lie Chevron’s core.  Once the scope of an agency’s 
jurisdiction is determined, it may be wholly appropriate to defer to the 
agency’s efforts to fill gaps in the agency’s organic statute, if indeed 
Congress intended the agency to make the rules necessary to carry out the 
statutory scheme.  But such policy questions are different in kind from the 
question of where Congress intended the outer limits of the statute to be: 
before a court defers to an agency’s conclusion as to how best to regulate a 
service, it should satisfy itself that Congress has, in fact, told it to do so, by 
independently determining whether the agency has jurisdiction over the 
service.  
 
B. Nondelegation Concerns 
 
Of course, one could argue that Congress did indeed intend the 
agency itself to determine the scope of its jurisdiction.67  
Telecommunications would seem to be a field where Congress would find 
“dynamic statutory interpretation” useful: technology changes so rapidly 
that Congress may intend the Commission to remain nimble and flexible, by 
allowing it to determine its own jurisdiction.  But this self-defining 
jurisdictional scheme would run afoul of the principles underlying the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
The nondelegation doctrine seeks to assure that basic, critical policy 
choices are decided by Congress, not agencies, by striking down statutes as 
unconstitutional that delegate the legislative power to another branch of 
government.68  As the Court has explained, the doctrine “is rooted in the 
principle of separation of powers that underlies our system of 
government.”69  The Constitution vests Congress alone with the power to 
make laws, because of its unique position as an elected deliberative body.  
“The ‘integrity and maintenance of that system of government ordained by 
the Constitution’ mandate that Congress cannot delegate its legislative 
power to another branch.”70   
But the nondelegation doctrine is animated by more than mere 
formalism: there are strong policy reasons why the legislative power should 
not be delegated to agencies.  First, Congress is politically accountable in a 
way that agencies are not.  While agencies are indirectly politically 
accountable, in the sense that they work for an elected president, this noisy 
signaling mechanism is not a substitute for the direct access that citizens 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 223, 251. 
68 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989); Manning, supra note 67, at 238-39. 
69 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371. 
70 Id. at 371-72 (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)). 
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have to their congressmen.71  Political accountability requires the legislative 
process to be more open to public inspection than rulemaking at many 
agencies.  Moreover, legislation must go through the constitutionally-
mandated process of bicameralism and presentment.  By requiring a bill to 
pass both houses of Congress and the President before becoming effective, 
the legislative process divides the legislative power and makes it more 
difficult for particular interest groups to “capture” the rulemaking process 
for private gain.72  The process also encourages a measure of deliberation 
and restraint in rulemaking, assuring “that the legislative power would be 
exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate 
settings.”73 
These safeguards should seem particularly significant to students of 
telecommunications, as the FCC has a reputation for dysfunctional 
operation.  As Phil Weiser has noted, the Commission has repeatedly been 
chastised for deciding major policy issues in private, with insufficient public 
deliberation.74  It has also developed a reputation for being unduly 
influenced by special interests: Weiser notes that former Chairman Reed 
Hundt once suggested that FCC stood for “Firmly Captured by 
Corporations.”75  The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly chastised the agency for 
relying heaving on ex parte proceedings rather than notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures, which permits well-connected special interests to 
wield undue influence over agency procedures.76  “Even the possibility that 
there is here one administrative record for the public and this court and 
another for the Commission and those ‘in the know’ is intolerable.”77  
Finally, the Commission has a long and well-earned reputation for ad-hoc 
decisionmaking rather than deliberate, reasoned strategic planning, a 
reputation that it is consciously trying to overcome.78  
Unfortunately, while the nondelegation doctrine has strong formal 
and functional rationales that would appeal to the Commission’s critics in 
particular, the Court has found the doctrine notoriously hard to enforce 
                                                 
71 As the Court noted in Chevron, this fact makes agencies more politically accountable than courts, 
which is one reason why courts should defer to their policymaking expertise.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
72 See Manning, supra note 68, at 239; INS v Chadha, 462 US 919, 951 (1983) (discussing the “fear that 
special interests could be favored at the expense of public needs”). 
73 Chadha, 461 US at 951. 
74 Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 677 (2009); see Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(chastising Commission’s secrecy as “inconsisten[t] …with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in 
due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits which undergirds all of our 
administrative law.”). 
75 Weiser, supra note 74, at 683-684.  To the Commission’s credit, the National Broadband Plan 
proceeding seems self-consciously designed to bring a greater level of long-range planning and foresight 
to spectrum allocation.   
76 Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 58.  
77 Id. at 54. 
78 Weiser, supra note 74, at 681. 
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directly.79  As the Mistretta Court explained, “in our increasingly complex 
society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress 
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad 
general directives.”80  Yet the Court refuses to abandon nondelegation 
principles altogether: it has been willing to use the nondelegation doctrine 
as a canon of statutory construction, to narrow the scope of a statute that 
would otherwise raise a serious nondelegation question.81  These tea leaves 
suggest the Court still takes seriously the principles underlying the 
nondelegation doctrine, even if it struggles to apply the doctrine itself to 
individual cases. 
Midwest Video II, MCI, and Comcast all display strong 
nondelegation themes.  In each decision, the Court is willing to scrutinize 
the agency’s jurisdictional claims closely, in part because of a concern that 
the agency’s interpretation would result in an unlikely or uncomfortably 
broad delegation of authority.  In Midwest Video, for example, the Court 
emphasized that “[t]hough afforded wide latitude in its supervision over 
communication by wire, the Commission was not delegated unrestrained 
authority” under the Act.82  The Court also acknowledged that its prior 
cable-related decisions only “cautiously”83 recognized the Commission’s 
efforts to regulate cable and stressed that those regulations “strain[ed] the 
outer limits” of its jurisdiction.84  The Court found that the Commisison’s 
proposed cable common carriage duties were inconsistent with the spirit of 
Section 3(h) of the Act, which sought to respect the editorial discretion of 
over-the-air broadcasters.85  Importantly, the Court rejected the 
Commission’s assertion that Section 3(h) applied only to broadcasters, and 
imposed no limitations on cable companies: “without reference to the 
provisions of the Act directly governing broadcasting, the Commission’s 
[ancillary] jurisdiction…would be unbounded.”86  In the process, the court 
rejected the agency’s broad interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, 
and instead interpreted the statute in a way that avoided an unlimited 
delegation of authority over cable. 
The MCI Court was also concerned that the agency’s interpretation 
of the Act would delegate the agency unchecked authority.  Ostensibly, the 
Court applied the Chevron framework and resolved the case at Chevron 
Step One: the majority found that the statute’s grant of authority to 
“modify” the tariff requirement unambiguously permitted only minor 
                                                 
79 Only twice has the Court found a statute so lacking in guidance as to be an unconstitutional delegation 
of authority, both in 1935.   
80Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
81 See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
82 Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 706. 
83 Id. at 708. 
84 Id. at 699. 
85 Id. at 706. 
86 Id. at 706. 
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changes, and that the Commission’s attempt to free non-dominant providers 
from the requirement completely thus exceeded the agency’s power.87  But 
as the dissent notes, permission to “modify…any requirement” seems fairly 
open-ended, and at least one contemporaneous dictionary definition of the 
word is susceptible to the Commission’s interpretation.88  Elsewhere in the 
opinion, the majority admitted that other factors colored its analysis.  In 
particular, the Court noted that tariff filings are, “in fact, the essential 
characteristic of a rate-regulated industry.”89  Therefore while determining 
whether the Commission’s action constituted a “modification” of the tariff 
requirement or something more, the Court was “[b]earing in mind [] the 
enormous importance to the statutory scheme of the tariff-filing 
provision.”90  The Court found that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress 
would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or 
even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion.”91  And it is “even 
more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a subtle device as 
permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”92  The Court rejected the 
Commission’s interpretation of the statute in part because it did not believe 
Congress implicitly delegated the Commission this much lawmaking power. 
Comcast reflects both Midwest Video’s discomfort with broad 
claims of agency authority and MCI’s skepticism that Congress intended 
such a broad delegation of authority through subtle, vague language.  First, 
the Court rejected the Commission’s claim to an unbounded general power 
to regulate broadband service under Title I: a finding that “the 
Commission’s ancillary authority may allow it to impose some kinds of 
obligations on cable Internet providers” cannot support “a claim of plenary 
authority over such providers.”93  Similarly, the Court rejected the 
Commission’s claim that general statements of congressional policy were 
sufficient to support the Commission’s jurisdiction over broadband, because 
these statements are not delegations of regulatory authority.  Extending the 
Commission’s ancillary authority based upon such broad, nonbinding 
statements “would virtually free the Commission from its congressional 
tether.”94  If accepted, the Commission would be free to enact the same 
requirements on internet service providers that the Commission places on 
telephone service, broadcasting, or cable services, without any direction 
from Congress to do so.  The Court explained that if Midwest Video II 
                                                 
87 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1994). 
88 Id. at 241-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
89 Id.at 231. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
94 Id. at 655. 
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exceeded the outer limits of the Commission’s jurisdiction, this claim 
“seeks to shatter them entirely.”95  
When pressed, the Commission offered a series of specific statutory 
duties to which its claimed authority over broadband might attach, but the 
Court rejected each in turn.  Perhaps most notably, the Commission claimed 
that regulation of Comcast’s network management practices was reasonably 
ancillary to its duty under Section 257 to report to Congress every three 
years on potential barriers preventing small business owners from entering 
the market for telecommunications or information services.96  The Court 
conceded that Comcast’s network management practices may be relevant to 
such a report.97  But channeling MCI, the court found that “the 
Commission's attempt to dictate the operation of an otherwise unregulated 
service based on nothing more than its obligation to issue a report defies any 
plausible notion of ‘ancillariness.’”98 
In each case, the Court rejected the Commission’s broad assertion 
of jurisdiction at least in part because of nondelegation-flavored concerns 
about boundless agency regulatory authority.  Although complainants did 
not raise a nondelegation challenge, and the Court has famously upheld the 
Communications Act’s charge to regulate in the “public interest” as a 
sufficiently intelligible principle,99 both Midwest Video and Comcast 
express concern that the agency must remain tethered to specific statutory 
directives rather than be permitted the broad authority of a roaming 
telecommunications lawgiver.  And both MCI and Comcast recognize that 
in practice, Congress is unlikely to delegate such broad authority to the 
Commission sub silentio.  In this sense, the Court’s skepticism toward the 
Commission’s jurisdictional claims reflects a shade of Sunstein’s 
observation that the nondelegation doctrine is “alive and well” and has been 
“relocated rather than abandoned” as “a series of more specific, and smaller, 
though quite important, nondelegation doctrines.”100  Given the important 
constitutional and policy provisions underpinning the doctrine, this 
skepticism about agency claims to broad jurisdiction is both expected and 
welcome, even against the backdrop of a general deference toward agency 
interpretations of its organic statute. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Id. 
96 Id. a 659. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 659-60. 
99 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); but see Randolph May, The Public Interest Standard: 
Is It Too Indeterminate to be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427 (2001). 
100 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (2000). 
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C. Institutional Competence 
 
Elizabeth Foote highlights another reason why courts should 
differentiate between jurisdictional and policymaking questions.  Foote 
notes that agencies and courts are fundamentally different institutions, with 
institutional strengths and weaknesses tailored toward performing different 
functions.  Courts are dispassionate and neutral arbiters of the law, designed 
to carefully weigh both sides of a legal argument and decide impartially 
what the law is.  By comparison, agencies are public bureaucracies charged 
with “carrying out” Congress’s statutory schemes.101  Unlike courts, 
agencies perform an “operational, policy-implementing role” by “choosing 
from among a variety of possible solutions to a particular set of specialized 
problems or challenges.”102 When doing so, agencies do not mimic the 
court’s dispassionate neutrality when divining Congress’s intent in a 
particular case.  On the contrary, agencies act with a particular (often 
politically-motivated) goal in mind, rely on their own expert judgments, and 
remain cognizant of accountability to the political branches.103  Agency 
alchemy synthesizes “law, politics, experience, and management”104 into a 
policy prescription in a way that courts could not, and should not, attempt to 
imitate. 
Looking at each institution’s comparative strengths, courts are 
better positioned to answer the legal question of where Congress set the 
boundary of an agency’s jurisdiction.105  The Administrative Procedure Act 
expressly instructs courts to “decide all relevant questions of law” and 
“interpret…statutory provisions,” and further instructs reviewing courts to 
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action” found to be “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction.”106  Defining the jurisdictional limits of an agency’s 
organic statute is a quintessential legal question, involving the use of 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation to find fixed meaning in a 
statutory text.107  Deferring to the agency’s own conclusion regarding its 
jurisdiction replaces his dispassionate legal analysis with a process that is 
consciously “mission oriented and politically directed.”108  Such deference 
is wholly appropriate when determining which of two legitimate policy 
objectives the agency should adopt; but it is misplaced when applied to 
more basic legal questions of the scope of an agency’s authority. 
 
                                                 
101 Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives 
the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 679 (2007). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 692-93. 
104 Id. at 684. 
105 Id. at 712. 
106 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
107 Foote, supra note 101, at 713. 
108 Id. at 712. 
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D. The Political Accountability of Independent Agencies 
 
Finally, courts may view the jurisdictional claims of independent 
agencies such as the Commission with particular skepticism, because 
independent agencies are less politically accountable.  As Randolph May 
has noted,109 the Chevron Court was motivated in part by the fact that 
“federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect the 
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.”110  This political 
accountability rationale appears often in both cases and academic literature 
discussing Chevron: Justice Kagan, for example, has noted the rise in 
presidential involvement in the daily operations of executive agencies, and 
has suggested that Chevron deference be “link[ed]” to such presidential 
involvement to encourage greater political “control as mitigating the 
potential threat that administrative discretion poses.”111  This logic suggests 
that courts should be less deferential to the conclusions drawn by 
independent agencies, which are structurally designed to be insulated from 
executive political control—a fact that both Kagan and May 
acknowledge.112 
This lack of political accountability weighs especially strongly in 
the context of jurisdictional questions.  The Progressive-Era Congresses 
shielded the FCC and other independent agencies from political influence so 
they could bring their professional expertise to bear on important questions 
without fear of being corrupted by politics.  Of course, no question is more 
important to an agency than the scope of its ultimate power—and when 
deciding such questions, an agency is susceptible to corruption of a different 
sort, the temptation to maximize influence and aggrandize power.  Chevron 
limits the Court’s ability to rein in wayward agencies that succumb to this 
natural temptation.  As Justice Kagan notes, this is not a fatal flaw in most 
cases, because a strong president will discipline agencies that overreach in 
ways that generate a political backlash.113  But the president’s power over 
independent agencies has been intentionally blunted—which suggests the 
need for a less deferential jurisprudence that would allow the Court to fill 
the void. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 See Randolph May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 429 (2006); Randolph May, Defining Deference Down, Again: Independent Agencies, 
Chevron Deference, and Fox, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 433 (2010). 
110 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
111 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001); id. at 2369.  
112 Id. at 2376; May, Defining Deference Down, supra note 109, at 441. 
113 See Kagan, supra note 111, at 2363. 
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III. DECIDING AGENCY JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS 
 
A. Distinguishing Jurisdictional from Policy Questions 
 
Cass Sunstein makes two related objections to so-called “Chevron 
Step Zero” inquiries such as the one suggested here.  First, Sunstein notes 
that agencies are policymakers at heart, and the determination of the limits 
of an agency’s statute is itself a policy choice.114  But this is only partly true.  
At the agency level, the legal question whether the Commission can (for 
example) enact rules governing broadband network management is 
inextricably intertwined with the policy question of whether such rules are 
necessary and if so, what they should be.  But they are distinct questions, 
and as Foote notes, the fact that agencies are policymakers is the very 
reason why we should not trust them to make legal questions.  Agency 
expertise is clearly relevant to the policy question of whether and how the 
agency’s jurisdiction should be expanded.  But the agency’s answer to the 
ostensibly legal question of whether it has authority to act will inevitably be 
colored by its policy judgment that action is necessary.  
Sunstein also notes that distinguishing between questions of agency 
jurisdiction and more routine policy questions is too difficult to administrate 
in practice.115  This objection is reminiscent of Justice Scalia’s observation 
that it is hard to differentiate between the question of whether an agency can 
regulate a service and whether the agency’s choice among policy 
alternatives is permissible.116  Admittedly, courts may find it difficult to 
decide at the margin whether (for example) the question presented in MCI is 
best understood as a legal question of the agency’s jurisdiction to act, or a 
policy question whether deregulation is appropriate, particularly given that 
Chevron does not carefully distinguish between the two.  Ultimately, 
however, the fact that a legal inquiry is hard should not alone constitute a 
reason to abandon it.  There is no reason why distinguishing between 
jurisdictional and policy questions presents any more difficult a challenge 
for the judiciary than ascertaining whether a particular action is an 
“unreasonable search” or any other difficult constitutional standard.  The 
“hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power”117 is no less prevalent in administrative 
agencies, and both constitutional and policy concerns demand that this 
pressure “be resisted.”118 
And while it may be challenging to identify jurisdictional questions 
that lay beyond Chevron’s scope, the Mead Court suggests both the need 
                                                 
114 Sunstein, supra note 47, at 246. 
115 Id. 
116 Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
117 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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and the pathway to do so.  In any given case involving a statutory 
interpretation question, the Court should ask whether the issue presents a 
question as to the agency’s jurisdiction.  But this inquiry is simply one 
species of the broader inquiry that Mead demands of all such cases: before 
the Court defers to the agency’s interpretation, how can it be sure that 
Congress meant for the agency to issue rules on this topic that carry the 
force of law?119 
Naturally, the most obvious indication of congressional intent is the 
statute itself: do the words Congress chose indicate clearly that it intends 
agency jurisdiction to extend to the subject at issue?  The clearer and more 
specific Congress’s jurisdictional grant is, the easier it is to conclude that it 
intended the agency to issue rules on the topic with the force of law.  But 
where, as is typical, the statute is unclear or broad, the Court must draw 
upon other tools of statutory interpretation.  Such tools could include the 
larger context in which the specific jurisdictional grant appears, the purpose 
of the statute as a whole, or perhaps the statute’s legislative history. 
MCI suggests that the Court should also look at the “importance” of 
the agency’s proposed course of action, compared to the statute from which 
the agency claims its jurisdiction.  The more significant or monumental the 
agency’s action is, the more evidence the Court should require that 
Congress meant the agency to act in this sphere.  Tariff filings were an 
integral feature of Title II, without which the Commission’s ability to 
regulate rates would be eviscerated.  The Court simply did not believe that 
Congress gave the agency discretion to eliminate the carefully-designed rate 
regulation regime through so benign a word as “modify.”120  Similarly, the 
Brown & Williamson Court recognized that tobacco is a significant and 
controversial industry whose regulation presents many politically-charged 
questions.  It therefore rejected the agency’s claim that tobacco fell under 
the FDCA’s jurisdictional grant, even though the statutory language could 
have been read as doing so.121 
Finally, as Gellhorn and Verkuil note, one way to determine 
whether the agency’s proposed regulation presents a jurisdictional question 
is how far the regulation strays from the agency’s “core regulatory 
assignment.”122  If an agency has not previously regulated the product or 
service, or asserted jurisdiction to do so, Congressional intent to regulate is 
less likely the less the product or service resembles those things that the 
agency does regulate.  The more the agency strays from its jurisdictional 
core, the more evidence is required before concluding that Congress 
intended the agency to reach as far as it seeks to. 
                                                 
119 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
120 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994). 
121 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). 
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One may object that the formulation above does not present a 
“Chevron Step Zero” inquiry, but instead simply suggests the need for a 
robust inquiry at Step One: the Court should use all the tools of statutory 
construction at its disposal before concluding that Congress has not directly 
spoken to the issue and proceeding to Step Two.123  In most cases, the 
distinction may seem semantic.  But there is a conceptual difference 
between the question whether Congress intended the agency to regulate a 
service at all, and whether Congress provided a clear rule or a free hand in 
the regulation of that service.  Practically, the difference lies in the case of 
silence: if Congress has not spoken as to whether the agency may regulate a 
service, the nondelegation doctrine suggests the presumption should be that 
the agency lacks jurisdiction to do so.  Whereas if Congress has given the 
agency jurisdiction over a service but has been silent regarding how it 
should do so, Chevron suggests the presumption should be that Congress 
intended the agency to fill this gap. 
 
B. Skidmore and the Jurisdictional Inquiry 
 
Of course, while the agency’s jurisdictional claims do not warrant 
Chevron deference, this does not “place [the agency’s action] outside the 
pale of any deference whatsoever.”124  Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,125 
“an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, 
given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information’ available to the agency.”126  “The fair measure of deference to 
an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with 
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its 
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of 
the agency's position.”127 
The agency remains an expert in the administration of its organic 
statute, and its views regarding the breadth of the statute and its extension to 
the service in question may warrant some deference.  Skidmore allows the 
court to take these views into account, but without mechanically giving this 
opinion the substantial deference owed under Chevron.  Skidmore allows 
the Court to determine the extent to which the agency’s views are a product 
of its expertise, and to discount those views to the extent they reflect the 
agency’s self-interest in aggrandizing power to itself.  It also allows the 
court to determine independently the extent to which the agency’s legal 
conclusion regarding its jurisdiction is colored by its policy conclusion that 
regulation is necessary or beneficial to society. 
                                                 
123 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 47, at 229. 
124 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234. 
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C. Applying the Framework to the Commission’s Proposed Broadband 
Rules 
 
The above framework yields important insights as the Commission 
turns its attention to the next phase in telecommunications regulation.  First 
and foremost, courts should continue to recognize that the Commission 
remains the nation’s foremost authority on telecommunications and should 
continue to defer to reasonable policy decisions that are clearly within the 
scope of the agency’s authority.  Yet courts should not be afraid to 
scrutinize agency claims of statutory authority that expand the scope of the 
agency’s jurisdiction or that effect dramatic departures from a 
congressionally mandated regulatory scheme.  The court ultimately may 
find that such expansion is permissible under the Act, but constitutional and 
institutional concerns demand that this scrutiny be performed without 
Chevron’s customary thumb on the scale of agency deference. 
More specifically, the D.C. Circuit was correct to scrutinize the 
Commission’s attempt to regulate Comcast’s network management 
practices.  The agency claimed near-plenary authority to regulate broadband 
providers under Title I and under general statements of Congressional 
policy.  But while Title I generally gives the FCC jurisdiction over 
“communication by wire or radio,” a statutory grant that would seem to 
encompass broadband service, this broad interpretation is inconsistent with 
the structure of the Act as a whole.  Titles II, III, and VI, governing 
telecommunications service, broadcasting, and cable, respectively, each 
represent a complex, meticulously designed regulatory scheme governing 
the service in question.  A plenary power over other communication by wire 
or radio is inconsistent with these schemes, which is why courts have 
required the FCC to tie its Title I authority to a specific grant of authority 
within its jurisdictional core.  Given the Internet’s prominence, the Court 
was correct to conclude that Congress did not intend the agency to exercise 
substantial regulatory authority under Title I sub silentio through general 
statements of policy or through an innocuous monitoring and reporting 
requirement. 
Nor should the level of scrutiny change if the Commission instead 
revives its earlier plan to reclassify the transmission component of 
broadband service as a Title II service.  Pundits and the Commission itself 
have put forth this possibility as a way to escape the close scrutiny of 
Comcast.  But the Commission has not historically regulated broadband 
service under Title II, and in fact has defended the proposition before the 
Supreme Court that broadband service is an unregulated “information 
service” rather than a Title II “telecommunications service.”128  While the 
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transmission component of broadband service may fit within the statute’s 
definition of “telecommunications”, 129 there is ample evidence from the 
statute that the service does not fit well into Title II.  Reclassifying 
broadband under Title II would subject broadband providers to a host of 
regulations that were clearly written for telephone companies and would be 
irrelevant at best (and possibly harmful) to the broadband industry.  As in 
MCI, the fact that most of Title II clearly pertains to telephones suggests 
that it is “unlikely” that Congress intended its Title II delegation to cover 
internet access as well.  The Commission’s claims run afoul of the 
deregulatory emphasis of the 1996 Telecommunications Act generally and 
Section 230 in particular, which emphasizes Congress’s desire that the 
Internet remain free of regulation.   
The Commission has suggested it could solve this problem by 
exercising its forbearance authority to relieve broadband providers from 
those portions of Title II that would be inappropriate to enforce against the 
industry.  But the use of forbearance to whittle a comprehensive telephone 
regulatory scheme into a custom-fit law of the Internet suggests that the 
Commission is venturing dangerously close to the type of unbounded 
regulatory authority that the Midwest Video and Comcast courts rightly 
feared.  The Commission may be correct that broadband transmission 
resembles telephone service, and its expertise may be entitled to some 
deference under Skidmore; but the overwhelming statutory evidence 
suggests that Congress has not (yet) intended to give the agency general 
regulatory authority over broadband, no matter how much (as a policy 
matter) the Commission feels it needs this authority.  It would be a mistake 
to defer to the agency’s conclusion otherwise under a misappropriation of 
the Chevron doctrine.  
 
IV. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE 
 
A careful study of the aftermath of Midwest Video and MCI suggest 
yet another reason to favor close judicial scrutiny of agency jurisdictional 
claims: this judicial oversight facilitates a more active dialogue between the 
agency and Congress, assuring that all three branches of government play a 
part in the modernization of telecommunications law.   
As discussed above, the Commission initially lacked direct 
jurisdiction over cable, and became interested in regulating this new 
industry when its growth began to threaten the interests of broadcasters.  
Tom Hazlett has argued that because broadcasters had considerable 
                                                 
129 The Communications Act defines “telecommunications” as the “transmission, between or among 
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influence at the FCC, the Commission’s early cable efforts were designed 
not to facilitate the introduction of a revolutionary new telecommunications 
service, but to protect the incumbent broadcasters from disruptive 
competition.130 The Commission adopted restrictions on cable providers’ 
ability to import out-of-market signals to compete against local 
broadcasters; it experimented with requirements that cable companies carry 
all broadcast stations in a local market; and it developed, then scuttled, a 
comprehensive set of programming restrictions limiting cable operators’ 
ability to show first-run feature films and sporting events.131  The 
Commission’s actions signaled that the growth of the cable industry was 
impacting the broadcasting ecosystem, and therefore some amount of 
agency oversight was necessary.  But the Commission’s reaction was 
typically ad hoc and failed to represent a comprehensive scheme for 
industry regulation.  Congress failed to get involved, perhaps due to a vague 
sense that the Commission was adequately managing the new threat.  Yet 
the haphazard nature of the Commission’s cable regulations, coupled with 
the lack of a more comprehensive regulatory scheme, left the industry in an 
“ill-defined state of regulatory uncertainty” that stifled investment and 
competition.132 
Meanwhile, Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video I suggested 
that there would be a limit to the agency’s ad hoc regulation of cable under 
its ancillary authority.  When the Court struck down the Commission’s 
common carriage rule in Midwest Video II, I sent an unmistakable signal to 
Congress that the need for cable regulation outstripped the Commission’s 
authority, and therefore comprehensive regulatory reform was necessary.  
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the 1984 Cable Act, which gave the 
Commission direct authority to regulate cable and a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme to guide these regulations.  Notably, this regulatory 
scheme was reminiscent of the Commission’s earlier ad hoc efforts, but it 
differed in several key ways.  For example, it adopted a limited must-carry 
rule similar to that upheld in Midwest Video I, and it included certain public 
access requirements, but nothing as onerous as the scheme rejected in 
Midwest Video II, and contained few cable content restrictions.  More 
generally, the Cable Act replaced ad hoc regulation to protect the special 
interests of broadcasters with a comprehensive regulatory scheme that 
reflected input from a wide swath of interested parties.  The result was a 
more stable, predictable regulatory environment than the FCC had achieved 
on its own, an environment that fostered exponential growth and 
development in the two decades that followed. 
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One can tell a similar story about telephone deregulation.  As 
discussed above, historically the Commission’s telephone policies had been 
shaped primarily by a set of rules written in 1934 to restrain Bell, which had 
a state-granted monopoly over both local and long-distance service on the 
theory that telephone service was a natural monopoly.133  But this statutory 
language was ill-suited to govern the competitive telephone market that had 
emerged by the late 1980s.134  Frustrated by the mismatch between its 
statutory mandate and the reality of the modern telephone landscape, the 
Commission adopted new rules that it felt were more amenable to an 
increasingly competitive industry, such as relieving new competitors from 
the burdens of filing tariffs, and requiring legacy local telephone companies 
to make their facilities available on an unbundled basis to new local 
competitors.135   
As in the cable context, these increasingly drastic measures signaled 
the Commission’s concern that its old practices were ill-suited to the 
modern landscape and needed change.  When the Court struck down the 
long-distance regulations in 1994, and the D.C. Circuit struck down the 
Commission’s local competition regulations shortly thereafter, the Court 
signaled its own concern that the Commission could not rewrite the law of 
the telephone without the oversight and guidance of Congress.  A scant two 
years later, Congress passed the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which 
replaced the old monopoly regulations with a managed competition regime, 
gave the Commission the flexibility it needed to tailor regulatory 
requirements to particular market players, and set the stage for explosive 
growth in telephone and other telecommunications services since. 
In both cases, close judicial review played an important role in 
prompting Congress to action.  By enacting rules at the periphery of its 
statutory authority governing cable and deregulating the telephone industry, 
the Commission signals the need to expand its regulatory operations in 
response to a dynamic marketplace.  When the Court struck down the 
agency’s rules as beyond its jurisdiction, the act in no way diminished the 
importance of the Commission’s initial signal. If anything, the high-profile 
nature of each case amplified the Commission’s cry for action, and 
augmented it with its own prompt for Congress to get involved.  In 
response, Congress passed comprehensive reform that took its cues from the 
Commission’s initial efforts but ultimately yielded a more thoughtful and 
inclusive solution than that which the Commission developed itself. 
Ideally, the Commission’s current efforts to regulate broadband will 
proceed as its earlier cable and telephone projects did.  The Commission is 
unquestionably correct that the internet is the telecommunications network 
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of the 21st century.  If Congress continues to believe that the Commission 
should play a role in regulating telecommunications networks, the 
Commission needs some jurisdiction to regulate broadband networks, as the 
Commission’s Comcast order suggests.  The Court’s reaction signaled to 
Congress the absence of such jurisdiction under the current act, and the need 
for a statutory mandate to govern internet regulation.  A clear statutory 
mandate would provide the Commission with a comprehensive regulatory 
scheme that reflects input from all interested parties, rather than the select 
few who have the Commission’s ear.  It would then permit the Commission 
to draft policy rules tethered to a direct fount of authority and guided by 
clear intelligible congressional principles.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Federal Communications Commission unquestionably remains 
the nation’s foremost authority on telecommunications regulation, and per 
Chevron, courts should continue to defer to policy judgments clearly within 
the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction.  But both the nondelegation doctrine 
and the policies underlying Chevron require that the Commission’s actions 
always be firmly tethered to a direct grant of authority from Congress.  It is 
the judiciary’s institutional role, and its constitutional duty, to assure that 
any agency jurisdictional claim satisfies this test.  The hydraulic pressure of 
each branch of government to exceed the outer limits of its power is no less 
strong within agencies than in other areas of government, and must be 
patrolled just as carefully.  Careful judicial review of such claims is 
necessary to assure that the Commission stays within its statutorily-
authorized boundary, and to prod Congress to action in the event that the 
Commission sees the need for regulation of additional services outside the 
scope of its current authority. 
 
